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ARTICLES
PROTECTING REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS: MAPPING
THE TRAJECTORY OF THE LAW
Edward J. Waitzer* and Douglas Sarro**
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved into a powerful
tool for judicial and regulatory activism and, as a result, a bellwether
for the trajectory of the law. The concept has broadened — both in
scope and in the range of potential claimants. Yet it has been used to
achieve goals that are remarkably consistent across different areas of
law: first, to require powerful actors to treat stakeholders fairly,
which entails treating them with honesty and avoiding actions that
would impose unnecessary or disproportionate costs on them; second,
to uphold the integrity of legal or regulatory regimes by remedying
actions that frustrate their purpose by allowing an actor to avoid the
obligations associated with these regimes. The doctrine is particu-
larly relevant to contemporary society, where legislative processes
have become constrained by, among other things, the short-term
incentives that inform and motivate political processes. As the
tension between public expectations and legislative responsiveness
becomes more severe, a growing role has emerged for our courts and
independent regulatory bodies to use reasonable expectations to
forge new legal pathways. This article outlines what appears to be an
accelerating trend — first by reflecting on the nature of “reasonable
expectations” and then exploring how the doctrine has been and is
likely to be applied.
* Professor and Jarislowsky Dimma Mooney Chair in Corporate Governance,
Osgoode Hall Law School and Schulich School of Business; Senior Partner,
Stikeman Elliott LLP, Toronto.
** Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York. The authors thank Stephen
Aylward for his helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved into a
powerful tool for judicial and regulatory activism and, as a result,
a bellwether for the trajectory of the law. The concept has
broadened – both in scope and in the range of potential claimants.
It is particularly relevant to contemporary society, where
legislative processes have become constrained by various factors,
including the difficulties faced by governments in tackling long-
term, systemic policy issues because of the short-term incentives
that inform and motivate political processes.1 This challenge is
reinforced by the growing degree of interdependence and inter-
connectedness that have come to define the world we live in — a
world where domestic regulation no longer provides adequate
instruments to deal with public stewardship challenges.2
As the tension between “public expectations” and legislative
responsiveness becomes more severe, a growing role has emerged
for our courts and independent regulatory bodies to attach the
term “reasonable” to nouns such as “expectations” (or “doubt”,
“person” and the like) to forge new, often radical, legal pathways.
This article outlines what appears to be an accelerating trend —
first by reflecting on the nature of “reasonable expectations” and
then exploring how the doctrine has been and is likely to be
applied.
II. NATURE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
While not without its conceptual challenges (some of which are
discussed below), it can be argued that the norm of protecting
reasonable expectations is a central organizing principle for most
legal rules.3 The concept is explicitly invoked in a number of areas
of law — including contract law, search and seizure law,
administrative law, fiduciary law, and corporate law. Even in
1. See, e.g., Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations, Now for the Long
Term (Oxford, Oxford Martin School, 2013), at pp. 45-46, online: <http://
www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/4.
2. See, e.g., ibid., at p. 41.
3. Roscoe Pound suggests that “we [can] explain more phenomena and explain them
better by saying that the law enforces the reasonable expectations arising out of
conduct, relations and situations” than by, for instance, adopting the theory that
the law enforces obligations only if the defendant explicitly consented to these
obligations. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New
Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1922), at p. 189.
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areas of law which do not explicitly use “reasonable expectations”,
the concept’s influence can nonetheless be observed.
There are obvious weaknesses. For one, the standard itself is
applied unevenly — private law generally emphasizes the more
subjective aspect of expectations of particular stakeholders, while
public law tends to focus more on objective “reasonableness”,
emphasizing the expectations of society as a whole. Nor is the test
susceptible to application in a principled manner when applied to
cases “near the margin”. Indeed, it is this essential contestability
that lends the principle its greatest utility when dealing with
borderline cases.
A related issue is its inherent circularity — as one case
examining the concept notes, if reasonable expectations are shaped
by what courts allow, they tend to become what courts say they
are.4 But by definition, “reasonable” expectations mean more than
the current law. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Re BCE
Inc.,5 reasonable expectations “look . . . beyond legality to what is
fair, given all of the interests at play” to address conduct that is
“wrongful, even if it is not actually unlawful.”6 Indeed, where the
law is in a state of transition, the expectations that are aroused
contribute to reform. Posner describes this dynamic as follows:7
[Judicial] [d]ecisions are not the only source of expectations — far from it.
Changing the law to bring it into closer harmony with lay intuitions of justice
and fair dealings may protect rather than defeat the parties’ expectations.
Again, a perceived weakness can also be a strength. Contextual
and dynamic, reasonable expectations can be thought of as legal
Polyfilla1— moulding themselves around other structures to plug
the gaps. This gap-filling, inherent to the administration of the
law,8 engenders reasonable expectations in and of itself. It is this
self-reinforcing feedback mechanism that posits “reasonable
4. Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1992), at pp. 1034-1035,
Kennedy J. (concurring).
5. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 2008 SCC 69 (S.C.C.).
6. BCE Inc., supra, footnote 5, at para. 71.
7. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Massachussets,
Harvard University Press, 1990), at p. 260.
8. See R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.), at p. 678 (“The courts are the
custodians of the common law, and it is their duty to see that the common law
reflects the emerging needs and values of our society.”); Re Dylex Ltd. (1995), 31
C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at para. 8, Farley J. (“the
court has the inherent jurisdiction to fill in gaps in legislation so as to give effect
to the objects of the [Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-
36]”).
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expectations” as a critical heuristic,9 helping us to understand how
tension points arise and are resolved, both on and beneath the
surface of the law. In this sense, it is a way of thinking about the
law that both informs and accelerates reform.10
III. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN
DIFFERENT CONTEXTS
Despite the wide range of contexts in which courts have applied
the doctrine, and the conceptual concerns outlined above, reason-
able expectations have been used to achieve objectives that are
remarkably consistent. We focus on two objectives that appear to
be the most salient: first, to require the fair treatment of others;
second, to uphold the integrity of legal or regulatory regimes by
remedying actions that frustrate their purpose by allowing an actor
to avoid the obligations associated with these regimes. Below, we
discuss examples of how reasonable expectations have been used to
further these objectives, as well as examples of legal doctrines and
regulatory actions that reflect similar objectives — evidence of the
power of reasonable expectations to shape the trajectory of the
law.
1. Fair Treatment of Others
Fair treatment has at least two aspects: minimizing the costs one
imposes on others and treating others with honesty. The “reason-
able expectation of privacy” test used in search and seizure law
tends to be applied in a way that reflects the first of these aspects.
It holds that, where an investigative tactic significantly impinges on
society’s interest in individual privacy, that tactic must be classified
as a “search” that is subject to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.11 This means that police are required to
minimize the costs the use of the tactic imposes on society (e.g., by
9. See Bradley H. Kuklin, “The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable
Expectations” (1997), 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 19, at p. 66.
10. See, e.g., Thomas D. Perry, “Dworkin’s Transcendental Idea”, in Peter A.
French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein, eds.,Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, Vol. 7 (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 255, at
p. 266 (“Legally difficult cases often cannot be decided intelligently without
having recourse to contemporary ideas of what is practical, fair, morally sensible;
and this is so much a part of the texture of legal reasoning that it seems artificial
to say that such ideas are not single ‘part of the law’”).
11. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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using the tactic only after obtaining a warrant that confirms that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that its use will yield
evidence of a crime). While reasonable expectations of privacy
often align with existing legal rights — for example, an individual
is recognized as having a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her home12 — they also regulate tactics that do not impinge on
any traditional “ownership” interest — such as the surreptitious
recording of another person’s conversations and requesting an
individual’s Internet subscriber information from his or her
Internet service provider.13
In BCE,14 the Supreme Court of Canada held that reasonable
expectations also formed the basis for a “duty of fair treatment” in
corporate law, which requires corporate boards of directors to
consider the effects their decisions have on corporate stakeholders,
and to avoid actions that “unfairly maximize a particular group’s
interest at the expense of other stakeholders.”15 The interests that
must be considered in this context are not limited to legal interests;
they include the economic, and possibly social, interests of the
affected stakeholders.16 For example, it has been held that
shareholders have a reasonable expectation that executives will
not unfairly maximize their own interests at the expense of other
stakeholders by awarding themselves “excessive” compensation
that is not necessary to the objective of attracting and retaining
qualified management.17 In the United States, judicial reference to
12. R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) (search of a home impinges on a
reasonable expectation of privacy). See also R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36
(S.C.C.) (search of one’s hotel room, which one has a license to use, impinges on
a reasonable expectation of privacy). Some violations of legal rights may not
offend reasonable expectations if they are viewed as merely “technical” or
“trivial” in nature, and the violation served an important objective. For example,
police may step onto an individual’s property to collect and search garbage that
has been left near the curb without impinging on that individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. R. v. Patrick, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, 2009 SCC 17 (S.C.C.).
13. R. v. Duarte; R. v. Sanelli, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.), at p. 44 (“If the state may
arbitrarily record and transmit our private communications, it is no longer
possible to strike an appropriate balance between the right of the individual to be
left alone and the . . . need to investigate and combat crime.”); R. v. Spencer,
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.), at para. 66 (noting that refusing to
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber records
would allow the state to arbitrarily obtain information linking an individual to
“intimate or sensitive activities being carried out online, usually on the
understanding that these activities would be anonymous”).
14. Supra, footnote 5.
15. BCE, supra, footnote 5, at para. 64.
16. BCE, supra, footnote 5, at para. 102.
17. König v. Hobza (2014), 326 O.A.C. 213, 2014 ONCA 691 (Ont. C.A.).
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reasonable expectations as a basis for relief under state oppression
statutes or in respect of fiduciary duty claims is now the norm.18
The controls on corporate behaviour imposed by the duty of fair
treatment differ somewhat from the controls imposed on police
through the reasonable expectation of privacy test. While the
reasonable expectation of privacy test focuses on the interests of
society as a whole, the duty of fair treatment focuses only on the
interests of corporate stakeholders. The practical difference
between these standards may gradually erode over time, as courts
lend greater recognition to the interests of the full range of
stakeholders listed in corporate fiduciary duty and oppression
cases — a list of stakeholders that, as stated in BCE, includes
employees, governments, and the environment.19 For example, a
court could hold that, where a board of directors pursues a course
of action that harms the environment, and that board had an
alternative available to it that would have avoided these harms
without imposing an undue burden on other stakeholders, that
board has acted contrary to reasonable expectations and (subject
to there being an eligible claimant, such as an institutional investor
with a long-term investment horizon) should be liable for
oppression.20
18. For a tabular presentation of authorities by U.S. state, see F. Hodge O’Neal and
Robert B. Thompson, O’Neal and Thompson’s Close Corporations and LLCs:
Law and Practice, revised 3d ed. and Supp. (New York, Thomson Reuters, 2004
and 2014), at § 9:18. Many state oppression statutes specifically refer to
reasonable expectations, and reasonable expectations have also been used to
determine breaches of statutory duties in states without an oppression statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 302A.751:
[I]n determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution or buyout, the court
shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely held
corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair and reasonable manner in the
operation of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as
they exist at the inception and developed during the course of the shareholders’
relationship with the corporation and with each other.
Brodie v. Jordan, 447Mass. 866, 857 N.E. 2d 1076 (Mass., 2006), at p. 1080 (noting
that “[a] number of other jurisdictions, either by judicial decision or by statute, also
look to shareholders’ ‘reasonable expectations’ in determining whether to grant
relief to an aggrieved minority shareholder in a close corporation.”).
19. BCE, supra, footnote 5, at paras. 39-40.
20. Oppression claims require a showing that the actions complained of are
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly disregards the interests of a
shareholder, creditor, director or officer of the corporation. See, e.g., Canada
Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 241(2). An investor with a
long-term time horizon that accordingly must take into account environmental
and other long-term risks could argue that a corporation that disregards these
considerations is treating that investor unfairly relative to other stakeholders with
a shorter time horizon.
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Tort law provides another example of how reasonable expecta-
tions have been used to prevent the imposition of unnecessary costs
on others. In T.J. Hooper,21 a leading American tort case,
“reasonable prudence” was held by Learned Hand J. to require a
tugboat operator to carry radio sets (a then relatively new
technology), even though they were not required to do so by
statute, on the basis that doing so had become a nearly universal
safety practice. In other words, the duty of care is a relative
concept that adapts to new technology, and the operator should
have weighed the risk of injury created by its lack of “compliance”,
and the gravity of the possible injury, against the costs that would
have been associated with mitigating this risk by adhering to
general practice.22 The Court of Appeal for Ontario more recently
enunciated the same concept in Kreutner v. Waterloo-Oxford Co-
operative Inc.,23 stating that, where a product or service placed on
the market creates a “substantial likelihood of harm” and “there
exists an alternative design that is safer and economically feasible”,
the party offering that product or service will be held to have failed
to act in accordance with reasonable expectations of prudence.24
The goal of preventing powerful actors from imposing
unnecessary or disproportionate costs on society guides a number
of other areas of law where reasonable expectations play a less
prominent role. For example, environmental law has been justified
as a means of limiting the environmental harms private firms
impose on society.25 Zoning law is similarly viewed as being
intended to minimize the costs heavy industry and other
commercial activities impose on residential neighborhoods.26
Recent regulatory responses to high-frequency trading (“HFT”)
provide a timely example of how regulators seem to be guided by
reasonable expectations. While the advent of electronic trading has
led to more liquid and efficient markets, there is widespread
21. The “T.J. Hooper”, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir., 1932).
22. The “T.J. Hooper”, supra, footnote 21, at p. 740.
23. (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 140 (Ont. C.A.).
24. Kreutner, supra, footnote 23, at para. 8.
25. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, “Externalities and the
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority” (1996), 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, at p. 29 (“The economic goal
of government regulation of pollution is to force polluters to bear the full costs of
their activities.”)
26. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights
Approach to American Land (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985),
at p. 234 (“The traditional story, at least as it is understood by economists, is that
zoning is necessary because in the absence of public controls, activities that
adversely affect the value of housing will locate in residential neighborhoods”).
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concern that the costs incurred in the “arms race” towards the
faster execution of trades may outweigh the benefits these efforts
have historically created for the market.27 Likewise, while society
arguably benefits from allowing the organizations that generate
important market-moving information to collect fees to support
their information-gathering efforts, the calculus changes when
these organizations allow HFT firms to obtain this data earlier
than other market participants.28 The latter activity would seem to
impose significant costs on non-HFT market participants, some of
whom would inevitably be on the losing end of trades with HFT
firms for the period during which HFT firms enjoy an informa-
tional advantage. Actions by regulators to discontinue the early
release of market data,29 as well as other proposals to reduce the
advantages HFT firms enjoy in the market,30 may be seen as an
attempt to find alternative means of facilitating price discovery
that impose fewer costs on market participants and society as a
whole.
In addition to imposing a duty to minimize the costs one
imposes on others, fair treatment entails standards of honest
conduct. For example, in Bhasin v. Hrynew,31 the Supreme Court
of Canada recognized, on the basis of “reasonable expectations”, a
“general duty of honest contractual performance.”32 The court was
careful to explain that this duty does not require contracting
parties to “put the interests of the other contracting party first” or
to “forego advantages flowing from the contract.”33 Rather, it
simply requires that the party to a contract not “lie or otherwise
knowingly mislead [the other party] about matters directly linked
27. See, e.g., Jeffrey MacIntosh, “In praise of high frequency traders”, Financial Post,
November 22, 2013, online: <http://business.financialpost.com/2013/11/20/in-
praise-of-high-frequency-traders/4 (“At some point, the commitment of ever-
larger sums of money to slicing ever-smaller fractions of time off trading times,
just to be first in line, becomes socially counter-productive”); Larry Harris, “Stop
the high-frequency trader arms race”, Financial Times, December 27, 2012, (“If
actions are not taken to stop this arms race, investors will be worse off and
economic welfare will decline”).
28. See Edward J. Waitzer and Douglas Sarro, “Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The
Road Ahead for the Financial Sector” (2014), 69 Bus. Law. 1081, at p. 1086.
29. Ibid.
30. See, e.g., Eric B. Buddish, Peter Cramton and John J. Shim, “The High-
Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design
Response”, Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-03 (December 23, 2013),
online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23882654.
31. [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, 2014 SCC 71 (S.C.C.).
32. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31, at para. 92.
33. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31, at para. 73.
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to the performance of the contract”,34 so that, “if the contract does
not work out, they will have a fair opportunity to protect their
interests.”35
The link between reasonable expectations and honesty has also
been recognized in the context of administrative law and corporate
law decisions dealing with the implications of promises and
representations by government and corporate actors. Courts have
held that, where a government official, agency or tribunal promises
to follow a particular process before making an administrative
decision, those affected by that decision have a reasonable
expectation that this process will be followed before the decision
is made.36 Further, where the promise made is substantive (e.g., to
grant a licence or an exemption from a legal requirement), the
government must provide heightened procedural protections to the
beneficiaries of that “promise” before it decides whether the public
interest requires it to renege.37 In BCE, it was similarly recognized
that, where a corporation makes representations in promotional
material, prospectuses, or other communications, stakeholders will
likely have a reasonable expectation that these representations will
be true.38
2. Reinforcing the integrity of social institutions
Courts have also used reasonable expectations to address
“avoidance tactics” that, if successful, would frustrate the purpose
of a legal regime by allowing an actor to avoid obligations that
ordinarily come with that regime, and accordingly undermine the
social institutions the regime was intended to uphold. Consider the
following examples:
. An insurance company purports to provide coverage for an
outdoor swimming pool, but includes an exclusionary clause
that would deny coverage for any “settling, expansion,
contraction, moving, bulging, buckling or cracking” of the
pool, which would seem to be the most obvious risks that could
result in damage to an outdoor pool.
34. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31.
35. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31, at para. 86.
36. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817
(S.C.C.), at para. 26. See also Bendahmane v. Canada (Minister of Employment &
Immigration), [1989] 3 F.C. 16 (Fed. C.A.).
37. Cook v. Alberta (Minister of Environmental Protection) (2001), 293 A.R. 237,
2001 ABCA 276 (Alta. C.A.).
38. BCE, supra, footnote 5, at paras. 79-80.
2016] Projecting Reasonable Expectations 293
. A financial advisor gives a client the impression that he or she
is providing advice that serves the client’s best interests, but
seeks to avoid the obligation to serve the best interests of that
client by sending the client a letter with lengthy, complicated
disclaimers.
In each of these cases, courts have resorted to reasonable
expectations to prevent these avoidance tactics from succeeding. In
Cabell v. Personal Insurance Co.,39 the Court of Appeal for Ontario
noted that, where the plain terms of an exclusion within a policy
operate in such a way as to nullify the type of coverage that the
parties reasonably expected would have flowed from the policy, the
terms of the policy will yield to the reasonable expectations of the
parties.40 Because the disclaimer in the policy covered the most
obvious risks that could result in damage to the pool, giving effect
to it would frustrate the purpose for which the insurance policy
was purchased. The court refused to do so, and required the
insurer to compensate the insured for the damage to the outdoor
pool.41
In Hodgkinson v. Simms,42 the Supreme Court of Canada
concluded that, because the advisor held himself out as indepen-
dent and as an expert on the particular subject matter on which the
client sought advice (real estate tax shelters), and effectively chose
his client’s investments for him, he had invited a reasonable
expectation that he would act in his client’s best interests, and
accordingly was subject to fiduciary obligations notwithstanding
disclaimers to the contrary.43 In doing so, the court noted that the
purpose of fiduciary law is to promote public trust and confidence
in financial advisors and others that provide specialized services to
the public or that are entrusted with the property of others.44
Allowing the advisor to solicit clients’ trust, but then avoid
39. (2011), 104 O.R. (3d) 709, 2011 ONCA 105 (Ont. C.A.).
40. Cabell, supra, footnote 39, at paras. 28-31.
41. Cabell, supra, footnote 39. A further means of incorporating reasonable
expectations into insurance law may arise from recent legislative reforms
implemented in British Columbia or Alberta, which explicitly authorize courts
to set aside insurance policy exclusions, in whole or in part, where these
exclusions are unreasonable or contrary to public policy. See generally Nigel P.
Kent, “Excluding Exclusions: The Role of Reasonableness in the Interpretation
of Insurance Policies”, Clark Wilson LLP, 2011, online: Clark Wilson LLP
<https://www.cwilson.com/publications/insurance/excluding-exclusions-the-
role-of-reasonableness.pdf4.
42. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 (S.C.C.).
43. Hodgkinson v. Simms, supra, footnote 42, at pp. 428-429, 431 and 433-434.
44. Hodgkinson v. Simms, supra, footnote 42, at p. 422.
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fiduciary obligations through the use of disclaimers, would likely
undermine the public trust and confidence fiduciary law seeks to
encourage. Recognizing a fiduciary relationship, on the other
hand, allowed the court to uphold this purpose.
The duty of good faith contractual performance recognized in
Bhasin is another means by which courts use reasonable
expectations to address avoidance tactics. One of the components
of the duty is an obligation not to “use a contractual power . . . to
evade a contractual duty.”45 For example, when a vendor in a real
estate transaction holds a contractual right to repudiate the
transaction where he or she is “unable or unwilling” to remove a
defect in title, the vendor is not entitled to exercise this right simply
because he or she regrets having entered into the transaction.46 As
noted by the Supreme Court in Bhasin, these types of controls on
the behaviour of contractual parties are “necessary to the proper
functioning of commerce.”47
Concern about avoidance tactics has permeated into areas of
law that are not explicitly guided by reasonable expectations, or in
which reasonable expectations have traditionally played only a
limited role. For example, the concept of “good faith”, which is
central to the interpretation of contracts in Quebec,48 has long
been instrumental in preventing contractual parties from avoiding
obligations that flow from the purpose of their contract.49
Another tool used to remedy conduct that undermines the
purposes of individual contracts and of contract law more broadly
45. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31, at para. 51. See also Freedman v. Mason, [1958] S.C.R.
483 (S.C.C.), at pp. 486-487.
46. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31, at para. 51.
47. Bhasin, supra, footnote 31, at para. 60.
48. Domtar Inc. v. ABB Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461, 2007 SCC 50 (S.C.C.), at para. 1:
The development ofQuebec’s lawof obligations has beenmarked by efforts to strike a
proper balance between, on the one hand, the individual’s freedom of contract, and,
on the other, adherence by contracting parties to the principle of good faith in their
mutual relations.
49. Sébastien Grammond, “Reasonable Expectations and the Interpretation of
Contracts Across Legal Traditions” (2010), 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 345, at p. 363. See
also Hôtel de l’Aéroport de Mirabel inc. c. Aéroports de Montréal, [2003] R.J.Q.
2479 (C.A. Que.), at p. 2484 (holding, under the doctrine of good faith, that an
airport authority that granted a lease to the operator of a hotel adjacent to the
airport had implicitly guaranteed that the authority would maintain a passenger
airport near the hotel for the duration of the lease). Some courts, in determining
what good faith requires, have explicitly used the reasonable expectations of the
parties as a reference point. See Grammond, ibid. See also Beaudoin c. Université
de Sherbrooke, [2007] R.J.Q. 1343 (C.S. Que.), at p. 1358; Hugh Collins, The Law
of Contract, 4th ed. (London, Butterworths, 2003), at p. 290.
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is art. 1437 of the Québec Civil Code,50 which empowers a court to
nullify, or reduce any obligation arising from, an “abusive clause in
a consumer contract or contract of adhesion” (such as an
insurance contract).51 An “abusive clause” is defined as “a clause
which so departs from the fundamental obligations arising from
the rules normally governing the contract that it changes the
nature of the contract.”52 For example, in Allendale,53 the Quebec
Court of Appeal struck down as “abusive” a clause in the standard
Hydro-Quebec power supply contract that would have exempted
the supplier from any liability towards its client, noting that the
clause not only diverged from industry practice, but undermined
the principle of “[a]ccountability”, which is “a fundamental
precept of the civil law of Quebec.”54 Article 1437 also has been
said to “imply a ‘duty of clarity’ that would fall on the shoulders of
those who want to impose contractual terms that are considered
unusual or harsh”,55 a duty that has long been recognized in
common law jurisdictions on the basis of reasonable expecta-
tions.56
Another example of reasonable expectations permeating into
other areas of law can be found in tax law, which traditionally has
been interpreted strictly, so as to allow taxpayers to organize their
affairs in a way that minimizes tax obligations.57 Parliament
stepped in to address tax avoidance by amending the Income Tax
Act58 to include a “general anti-avoidance rule”, whereby a
taxpayer that engages in a transaction that results in a “misuse” or
“abuse” of a provision of the Income Tax Act (i.e., avoiding its
application despite the fact that the sort of conduct the individual
50. Civil Code of Québec, C.Q.L.R. c. C-1991.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. c. Hydro-Québec (2001), [2002] R.J.Q. 84 (C.A.
Que.).
54. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., supra, footnote 53, at paras. 18, 29, 46-47.
55. Grammond, supra, footnote 49, at p. 361. See, e.g., 9127-3870 Québec inc.
(Domaine Témi Kami) c. Deschamps, 2010 QCCQ 5422 (C.Q.), at para. 26;
Caron c. Évasion Hors-piste inc., 2009 QCCQ 6954 (C.Q.), at para. 21; Chartrand
c. Groupe PPP ltée, 2006 QCCQ 3484 (C.Q.), at para. 24.
56. Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (Ont. C.A.);
Turczinski Estate v. Dupont Heating & Air Conditioning Ltd. (2004), 246 D.L.R.
(4th) 95 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 39, leave to appeal refused (2005), 208 O.A.C. 397
(note) (S.C.C.) (“Nor can contracting parties necessarily rely on a standard form
limitation of liability or damages clause in a consumer contract, unless the
specific clause has been brought to the attention of the consumer”).
57. See Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, 2005 SCC 54
(S.C.C.), at para. 11.
58. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).
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is engaged in is contemplated by that provision) may be subject to
tax obligations as if the transaction never occurred.59
In summary, reasonable expectations, by “look[ing] beyond
legality to what is fair” and addressing conduct that is “wrongful,
even if it is not actually unlawful”,60 operates to close gaps in the
law by requiring individuals and organizations to consider the
interests of others and to minimize the costs they impose on their
stakeholders as well as on society as a whole. It also empowers
courts to reinforce the integrity of legal relationships and regimes,
along with the social institutions that rely on them, by preventing
attempts to avoid the obligations imposed by these relationships
and regimes.
One author notes that reasonable expectations are “not about
what courts say, but rather what they do”61 — that reasonable
expectations can explain patterns of decision-making even when
they are not explicitly invoked by decision-makers.62 The
similarities between the rules imposed in areas of law where
reasonable expectations are explicitly invoked and those imposed
in other areas of law or regulation would seem to support this
thesis, further establishing the importance of reasonable expecta-
tions in shaping the trajectory of the law.
IV. MAPPING THE TRAJECTORY OF THE LAW
Having described the principles that have given content to the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, we now discuss some of the
implications these principles, and their continued development,
could have for market participants. In particular, we believe that
regulators’ and courts’ enhanced understanding of the link
between private law and the public interest will lead them to use
reasonable expectations to extend the scope of legal protections
available to stakeholders, including future generations and the
environment, in the following ways: (1) broadening rules relating
to standing and intervenor status to make it easier for environ-
mental and other groups to challenge harms to stakeholders caused
by powerful actors; (2) expanding materiality and corporate
reporting requirements relating to environmental and other social
59. Ibid., s. 245(4); see also Canada Trustco, supra, footnote 57, at para. 66.
60. BCE, supra, footnote 5, at para. 71.
61. Barry J. Reiter, “A Study in Reasonable Expectations: A Rebuttal to Geoff R.
Hall” (2007), 46 C.B.L.J. 95.
62. John Swan, Canadian Contract Law (Markham, LexisNexis, 2006), at pp. 500-
501.
2016] Projecting Reasonable Expectations 297
issues; (3) adopting intergenerational equity as a paradigm for
assessing whether defined benefit plan pension fund trustees have
met their fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries; (4) piercing the
corporate veil to hold parent companies liable for environmental
and human rights harms caused by their subsidiaries; and (5)
exercising statutory “public interest” powers to remedy unfair
market conduct.
1. Broadening Standing and Intervenor Status
Public interest standing is an important vehicle by which
environmental and other public interest groups can challenge
government actions that defy reasonable expectations. Courts have
significantly reduced the barriers to obtaining public interest
standing so as to ensure that government actions are not
“immunized from judicial review” due to an absence of persons
whose private interests are directly affected by these actions and
who have the resources necessary to mount an effective challenge
to these actions in court.63 Under the current test, a public interest
group can obtain standing to challenge a government action if it
raises a “serious justiciable issue” and has a “genuine interest” or
“real stake” in the issue, so long as “in all the circumstances, the
proposed suit is a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue
before the courts.”64
Though public interest standing exists only in the context of
public law, courts have increasingly recognized that private law
often has a public dimension. The Supreme Court has recognized
that one of the reasons legislators enacted insolvency legislation
was because “[r]eorganization serves the public interest by
facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services
crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of
jobs.”65 Accordingly, courts frequently consider the “social and
economic” consequences of bankruptcy before making orders in
insolvency proceedings.66 Further, the Supreme Court has
63. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524, 2012 SCC 45 (S.C.C.), at para. 31,
quoting Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General) (No. 2) (1974), [1975] 1 S.C.R.
138 (S.C.C.), at p. 145.
64. Downtown Eastside, supra, footnote 63, at para. 37.
65. Re Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd.; Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [2010] 3
S.C.R. 379, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), at para. 18. See also Nova Metal Products Inc.
v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 57, Doherty
J.A. (dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Re Clothing for Modern Times Ltd., 2011 ONSC 7522 (Ont. S.C.J.
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acknowledged that the “underlying purpose” of fiduciary law
“may be seen as protecting and reinforcing the integrity of social
institutions and enterprises” that are of significant public
importance.67 Courts have recognized that pension law engages
issues of intergenerational equity,68 and pension trustees com-
monly acknowledge an obligation to consider the interests of
future generations when making investment decisions.69 Finally, as
discussed above, the stakeholders whose interests corporate
directors should consider in discharging their fiduciary duties
and their duty of fair treatment include not only shareholders and
creditors, but also “employees, . . . consumers, governments and
the environment.”70
The acknowledged link between the private sector and the
public interest indicates that, just as courts have broadened public
interest standing in public law, so may they become more willing to
permit public interest groups to participate in corporate, in-
solvency or pension litigation. One avenue may be intervenor
status. Where litigation has already been commenced by a private
party, a public interest group may be able to influence the outcome
of that litigation by seeking appointment as an intervener. Such
status is often granted in both public and private litigation, so long
as the intervener is able to bring a fresh perspective on issues
relevant to the litigation, and so long as the litigation itself has
some public importance.71 The relevance of corporate and
[Commercial List]), at para. 13; Re Great Basin Gold Ltd., 2012 BCSC 1773 (B.C.
S.C. [In Chambers]), at para. 13; Re Comstock Canada Ltd., 2013 ONSC 4756
(Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 38.
67. Perez v. Galambos, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, 2009 SCC 48 (S.C.C.), at para. 70,
quoting Hodgkinson v. Simms, supra, footnote 42, at p. 422.
68. See, e.g., Bennett v. British Columbia (2009), 77 C.C.P.B. 56, 2009 BCSC 1358
(B.C. S.C.), affirmed (2012), 96 C.C.P.B. 268 (B.C. C.A.); B.C.N.U. v. British
Columbia (Municipal Pension Board of Trustees) (2006), 50 C.C.P.B. 77, 2006
BCSC 132 (B.C. S.C.); Withers v. Teachers’ Retirement System of City of New
York, 447 F.Supp. 1248 (S.D. N.Y., 1978) at pp. 1257-1258.
69. See, e.g., Don Raymond, Senior Vice President, Public Market Investments,
Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, “Responsible Investing: An Investor’s
Perspective” (Speech given at the Conference Board of Canada, March 26, 2007),
at p. 12, online: <http://www.cppib.com/content/dam/cppib/public-media/news-
releases/2007/2007_March26_DonRaymond_CSR.pdf4:
Oftenwhenpeople talk about sustainability and responsible investing, they talk about
our obligation to future generations. As investors with a mandate to help sustain the
CanadaPensionPlan for the benefit ofmore than 16millionCanadians,we talk about
that obligation every day. We have a long-term investment horizon and a very deep
commitment to managing long-term portfolio risks.
70. BCE, supra, footnote 5, at para. 40.
71. Reference re Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland), [1989] 2 S.C.R.
335 (S.C.C.), at p. 340 (“an intervention is welcomed if the intervener will provide
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insolvency law to the public interest would appear to provide an
opening for public interest groups to intervene in corporate or
insolvency cases that have environmental, labour, or human rights
implications. The link between pension law and the goal of
intergenerational equity may provide an avenue by which
advocates for future generations could obtain standing in pension
cases that raise issues that have implications for multiple
generations.
Legislative and regulatory reforms could also expand the range
of claimants that can initiate proceedings (as opposed to
intervening in existing proceedings) to seek a remedy for breaches
of reasonable expectations. For instance, in recognition of the
intergenerational nature of pension obligations, one could envision
reforms that create an ombudsperson for future generations with
standing to represent the interests of future generations of pension
beneficiaries in pension litigation.72
It also is not difficult to imagine judicial or legislative reforms
that allow a form of limited “public interest” standing as a means
of addressing significant environmental or human rights harms
caused by business organizations. The Supreme Court has
suggested that the Crown has not only a right, but a duty, to
prevent and remedy severe environmental harm.73 In doing so, the
court discussed the “public trust doctrine” that operates in a
number of American states and holds both that the government
has a duty to protect natural resources for the benefit of future
generations and that individuals are entitled to sue their govern-
ment when it fails to act in accordance with this duty.74 This
decision could provide a basis for granting standing to private
parties seeking to challenge failures by government to protect the
environment, or for reforms that allow public interest groups to
seek leave from the court to stand in the shoes of the government
and directly challenge actions by private actors that cause
significant environmental harm.
the Court with fresh information or a fresh perspective on an important
constitutional or public issue”).
72. For a discussion on how such a proposal could work, as well as examples of
similar institutions established internationally, see Waitzer and Sarro, “Fiduciary
Society Unleashed”, supra, footnote 28, at p. 1108.
73. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74, 2004 SCC
38 (S.C.C.), at paras. 67-68 and 81.
74. British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., supra, footnote 73, at paras.
78-80.
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2. Piercing the Corporate Veil
A basic tenet of corporate law is limited liability. Notwithstand-
ing its clear articulation in virtually every corporate law statute,75
courts have developed the concept of “piercing the corporate veil”
to address concerns about abuse of the corporate form. A recent
Ontario judgment described a number of widely accepted grounds
for piercing the corporate veil:76
(a) where the corporation is “completely dominated and controlled and being
used as a shield for fraudulent or improper conduct”; (b) where the
corporation has acted as the authorized agent of its controllers, corporate or
human; and (c) where a statute or contract requires it [citations omitted].
Courts have shown an increased willingness to pierce the veil in
tort claims, where in addition to individual liability, an employer is
often vicariously liable for the actions of its subsidiaries — such as
breaches of pension, environmental and human rights obligations
— even when there is little or no evidence that the subsidiaries at
issue were established or used for the express purpose of avoiding
obligations. This was the basis for the Choc v. Hudbay Minerals
Inc. decision in which, on a preliminary motion, the Ontario
Superior Court did not reject the argument that the Canadian
parent company could be held liable for the torts allegedly
committed by its defunct subsidiary in Guatemala.77
Not surprisingly, many commentators have called for a more
disciplined framework. Professor Neyers argues that “[w]hen the
court is asked to justify [piercing the corporate veil], its only
response seems to be because ‘the situation demands’ or ‘I feel like
75. For example, s. 45 of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides that “the
shareholders of a corporation are not, as shareholders, liable for any liability, act
or default of the corporation.”
76. Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., [2013] O.J. No. 3375, 2013 ONSC 1414 (Ont.
S.C.J.), at para. 45. There are other circumstances in which the corporate veil will
be pierced. One is when a business owner does not maintain the formalities
required by corporate law with respect to the distinct legal personality of the
corporation. Kobes Nurseries Inc. v. Convery (2011), 98 B.L.R. (4th) 234, 2011
ONCA 662 (Ont. C.A.).
77. Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., supra, footnote 76. See also Sun Capital Partners
III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, 724 F.3d
12956 (1st Cir., 2013) (private equity company held liable for unfunded pension
liabilities of one of its portfolio companies); Alcoa Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 71261, 2014 WL 69457 (Jan. 9, 2014) (international aluminum producer
charged under U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for bribery carried out by its
subsidiaries in Bahrain; agrees to pay $384 million fine). See also Yaiguaje v.
Chevron Corp., 2013 ONCA 758 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed (2015), 388 D.L.R. (4th)
253, 2015 SCC 42 (S.C.C.).
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it.’”78 It may be useful to better define specific criteria that would
provide guidance, perhaps by statute, both with respect to the risk
of personal liability in particular circumstances and as to standards
of conduct required to benefit from the protection of limited
liability. That said, two widely held observations as to the current
state of the law — that it is very difficult to predict how a court will
rule in any particular case and that courts should take a more
cautious approach to the veil-piercing “doctrine”79 — appear to be
out of step with the trajectory of the law.
Judges recognize the extraordinary nature of the veil-piercing
remedy in the face of statutes that expressly limit shareholder
liability for corporate misconduct. Hence their tendency to resort
to detailed, albeit highly contextual, rationalizations of “excep-
tional” circumstances in which the remedy is invoked. Perhaps the
most detailed analysis of late was that of Lord Sumption in
Petrodel.80 He proposed the following test:81
[W]hen a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to
an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his
control . . . [t]he court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and
only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the
advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company’s
separate legal personality.
This is, in itself, uncontroversial. As a recent comment on
Petrodel notes, courts have long exercised their equitable jurisdic-
tion “to preclude the use of a legal institution . . . to effect a
fraudulent or dishonest evasion of the law.”82 What is significant
about recent Canadian and American veil-piercing decisions is that
they seem to discard the notion that only a “deliberate” or
“fraudulent” evasion of the law will justify piercing the corporate
veil. What appears to have informed decisions like HudBay is that,
regardless of the purposes intended by the corporate structures at
issue, these structures had the effect of undermining the purposes
of the legal regimes alleged to have been infringed. In respect of
tort law, this means ensuring that those who suffer reasonably
78. J.W. Neyers, “Canadian Corporate Law, Veil Piercing and the Private Law
Model Corporation” (2000), 50 U. Toronto L.J. 173, at p. 182.
79. See Thomas G. Heintzman and Brandon Kain, “Through the Looking Glass:
Recent Developments in Piercing the Corporate Veil” (2013), 28 Banking & Fin.
L. Rev. 526, at pp. 539-542.
80. Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd., [2013] UKSC 34 (U.K. S.C.).
81. Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd., supra, footnote 80, at para. 35.
82. Heintzman and Kain, supra, footnote 79, at p. 538.
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foreseeable harm as a result of the tortious actions of a corporation
can access a remedy for that harm.83 In respect of breaches of
statutory or regulatory schemes, a leading Canadian veil-piercing
decision notes that the goal of giving effect to a statutory or
regulatory scheme has been recognized as an independent
justification for piercing the corporate veil.84 A recent study of
corporate veil-piercing in the United States concludes that “the
most straightforward theory that explains courts’ decision to pierce
the corporate veil is furthering a regulatory or statutory scheme
whose purpose would be undermined by upholding the corporate
form.”85
The jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil can be thought of as
a particular application of the principle that one should not be
permitted to act in a way that undermines the integrity of legal
relationships and institutions, a principle that responds to
“reasonable expectations”. In this manner, it has become an
instrument to accelerate the legal legitimization of social norms
and encourage good corporate citizenship.
3. Materiality and Corporate Reporting Requirements
The evolution of public company disclosure requirements is
another illustration of the trajectory we have outlined. As a general
proposition, public companies are required to make timely
disclosure of “material” information. “Materiality” has been
defined by the courts and securities regulators in terms of there
being a “substantial likelihood that the information would have
been viewed by the ‘reasonable investor’ as having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available.”86 Likewise,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has stated
that information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that
83. It should be noted that, unlike those harmed by breaches of contract, who have
an opportunity in negotiating the relevant contract to ensure that it can reach
through the corporate veil to access a remedy (e.g., through a guarantee of a
corporation’s obligations by its parent), those harmed by a corporation in tort
have no prior opportunity to ensure that they can access a remedy for such harm.
84. Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1996),
28 O.R. (3d) 423, [1996] O.J. No. 1568 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 433, affirmed 1997
CarswellOnt 3496, [1997] O.J. No. 3754 (Ont. C.A.) (“It is also the case that the
courts will look behind corporate structures where necessary to give effect to
legislation, especially taxation statutes”).
85. Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts, “Finding Order in the Morass: The Three
Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil” (2014), 100 Cornell L. Rev.
99, at p. 115.
86. TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (U.S. Ill. S.C., 1976), at p. 449.
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a ‘reasonable person’ would consider it important.”87 Canadian
law takes a similar approach.88
As with “reasonable expectations”, the concept of a “reasonable
person” or “reasonable investor” (and, therefore, of “materiality”)
is somewhat circular and, therefore, path-dependent.89 While
standards have evolved around financial reporting, it would be
hard to argue that a “reasonable investor” seeking to maximize
long term risk-adjusted returns would not also have regard for a
variety of non-financial (e.g., environmental, social, reputational,
relational and governance) information.
It has been argued that the singular focus of the investor
community on mandated financial reporting enables massive
wealth destruction.90 To the extent that a company’s ability to
survive and prosper depends on its success in creating value
through strong stakeholder relations, this information is clearly
“material”. Moreover, such disclosure serves a broader, systemic
purpose — as noted in 1913 by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis, “publicity” is “justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”91
Cynthia Williams has noted that the U.S. Congress provided the
SEC with the authority to require disclosure of facts concerning
how companies were being managed. In her view, this necessarily
requires “information that tracks compliance with a comprehen-
sive array of statutes and international treaties” and “information
about activity that is legal, though controversial.”92 Others have
87. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 – Materiality, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug.
12, 1999).
88. See Sharbern Holding Inc. v. Vancouver Airport Centre Ltd., [2011] 2 S.C.R. 175,
2011 SCC 23 (S.C.C.), at para. 61 (in which the Supreme Court of Canada adopts
a “reasonable investor” standard for determining materiality); CSA National
Policy 51-201 (Disclosure Standards) (in which the Canadian Securities Admin-
istrators note that the “market impact” and the “reasonable investor” standards
are likely to converge, for practical purposes, in most cases).
89. Wendy Gerwick Couture, “Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity”
(2015), 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 453.
90. John Graham, Campbell Harvey and Shiva Rajgopal, “Value Destruction and
Financial Reporting Decisions” (2006), 62:6 Fin. Analysts J. 27, at p. 27 (“[T]he
destruction of shareholder value through legal means is pervasive, perhaps even a
routine way of doing business. Indeed, the amount of value destroyed by
companies striving to hit earnings targets exceeds the value lost in high-profile
fraud cases”).
91. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money, and How the Bankers Use It (New
York, F.A. Stokes, 1914), at p. 92.
92. Cynthia A. Williams, “The Securities and Exchange Commission in Corporate
Social Transparency” (1999), 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1199, at pp. 1274-1275.
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argued that, to the extent public companies “assume obligations of
public trust and accountability when they sell stock to the public”,
such obligations include full disclosure of material information
necessary “to promote investor confidence in the truth and
accuracy of issuing companies’ financial statements.”93 This logic
suggests that changing expectations (and market conditions) have
overtaken the current accounting and regulatory framework,
creating a situation in which a broad range of non-financial
information is material but not yet mandated or consistently
reported on.
Historically, securities regulators have resisted the characteriza-
tion of such information as material. Consider, for example, the
protracted confrontation that the SEC had with the Natural
Resources Defence Council during the 1970s over proposals for
increased social and environmental disclosure, during which the
SEC claimed that such information was not material to investors
and that the costs of such disclosure outweighed its benefits.94
Through several years of rule-making, hearings and court
proceedings, the SEC’s opposition to these increased disclosure
requirements prevailed,95 and for a generation, the SEC’s
pronouncements on environmental disclosure lagged public senti-
ment, which came to view governance and environmental matters
as having risen to a level of materiality for investors, and disclosure
thereof as responsive to the “reasonable expectations” of other
stakeholders and the general public.
Regulators now recognize this gap. The SEC has addressed the
issue of climate change by issuing an interpretive release which
provides guidance as to how the “materiality” threshold may
require disclosure of relevant environmental information.96 The
release notes that the actual or potential impacts of the physical
effects of climate change on an issuer’s business, as well as the risks
93. David Monsma and Timothy Olsen, “Muddling through Counter-Factual
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to
Disclose Material Non-Financial Information” (2007), 26 Stan. Envt’l L.J. 139,
at p. 141.
94. For a detailed discussion of the NRDC case and the SEC’s rationale for opposing
increased disclosure, see Williams, supra, footnote 92, at p. 1257.
95. See Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil
Rights, Exchange Act Release No. 9252 (July 19, 1971); Steve Lydenberg, “On
Materiality and Sustainability: The Value of Disclosure in the Capital Markets”
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Initiative for Responsible Investment, Hauser
Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University, September 2012),
at p. 20.
96. SEC Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
6,290 (February 2, 2010).
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and opportunities arising from scientific, legal and political
developments relating to climate change, may be material to an
issuer’s business and should therefore be discussed in that issuer’s
disclosure documents.97
Securities and other regulators have addressed not just climate
change but other social and governance issues.98 The volume of
mandated governance disclosure continues to explode in response
to demand for corporate and market accountability.99 A number
of stock exchanges have or are planning to launch sustainability
indices and are requiring or encouraging listed companies to
publish corporate social information (or explain why they are not
doing so).100 Several countries require sustainability reporting for
certain domestic corporations.101 The European Parliament has
passed legislation requiring publicly traded companies with more
than 500 employees to report on non-financial sustainability
factors effective in 2017.102
The private sector is also taking proactive steps to address social
and environmental issues. The majority of the companies in the
S&P 500 and the Fortune 500 indices are reporting voluntarily on
their environmental, social and governance impacts.103 Financial
institutions with combined assets under management of over
U.S.$59 trillion have become signatories to the U.N. Principles for
Responsible Investment.104 Several have adopted investment
beliefs which include a commitment to “consider risk factors, for
example climate change and natural resources availability, that
97. Ibid.
98. Recent examples of mandated disclosure include the sourcing of “conflict
minerals”, payments to governments by resource extraction issuers and disclosure
of business with certain governments, persons and entities subject to specific U.S.
trade sanctions. See, respectively, Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274
(September 12, 2012); Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77
Fed. Reg. 56,365 (September 12, 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r).
99. See, e.g., Ontario Securities Commission Notice 51-717, “Corporate Governance
and Environmental Disclosure” (December 18, 2009).
100. See, e.g., Robert Kropp, “Brazilian Stock Exchange Recommends that Compa-
nies Report or Explain”, socialfunds.com, January 7, 2012).
101. See, e.g., “Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in Denmark: Impact of the
Legal Requirement for Reporting on CSR in the Danish Financial Statements
Act” (Danish Business Authority, August 2010).
102. Press Release, European Commission, Disclosure of Non-Financial Information
(September 29, 2014), online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATE-
MENT-14-291_en.htm4.
103. Governance and Accountability Institute, Inc., 2012 Corporate ESG/Sustain-
ability/Responsibility Reporting, Does it Matter? (December 15, 2012).
104. United Nations Principles on Responsible Investment, online: <http://www.un-
pri.org4.
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emerge slowly over long time periods, but could have a material
impact on company or portfolio returns.”105
The mandated disclosure of material sustainability data is a
logical next step in the evolution of corporate reporting require-
ments, one that is responsive to the reasonable expectations of
investors — who increasingly understand the connections between
their interests and those of other stakeholders — and, by
mitigating existing incentives for public companies to underinvest
in sustainability, one that serves a greater public interest.
4. Intergenerational Equity – the Duty of Impartiality
A striking example of the power of “reasonable expectations” as
a legal compass is in respect of the fiduciary duties of trustees of
defined benefit pension plans. In the course of a generation, we
have seen a dramatic shift from a narrow economic focus which
conflated “prudence” and “rationality” to legal standards based on
reasonable expectations.106 The former was rooted in beliefs about
efficient markets and rational behaviour — at the individual and
systemic level. The latter acknowledges that markets often miss
that part of freedom that has to do with the ability of participants
to have a say in shaping our society.107 More specifically,
“rational” investors have been required by regulation to focus on
short-term investment returns, measured by market price, rather
than on the objective well-being of beneficiaries, the sources of
investment reward in the real economy or their obligation to
allocate benefits impartially between current and future benefici-
aries. In contrast, reasonableness supposes that decision-makers
act with reference to others in society and to agreed-upon
principles and norms — i.e., concern with the protection or
enhancement of the common good.108
During the 1990s, modern portfolio theory (MPT) provided the
theoretical foundation for significant reforms in the duties of fund
105. See, e.g., California Public Employees’ Retirement System, CalPERS Investment
Beliefs (2013), at p. 6, online: <https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/invest-
ments/policies/invo-policy-statement/investment-beliefs.pdf4.
106. See, e.g., CalPERS Investment Beliefs, supra, footnote 105.
107. See Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New
York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).
108. As John Rawls explains, persons can be said to act reasonably when “they are
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to
abide with them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so.”
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Cambridge, Massachussets, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1991), at p. 49.
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fiduciaries.109 By assuming efficient capital markets and substitut-
ing portfolio level diversification and risk control for judgment-
based securities selection as the basis for prudent investment,
trustees were enabled to pursue investment policies that promised
less risk and better returns.110 Coincidently, MPT benefited
financial service providers, by reducing their exposure to liability
for imprudent investments.111 As with many of the classes of
investments made by trustees under the “prudent investor” regime,
the regulatory framework proved too good to be true. While it
focused fiduciaries’ attention on the maximization of portfolio-
level returns and their obligation to avoid personal conflicts of
interest, it also led to herd-like behaviour, with most fiduciaries
focusing on “beating the markets” in the short-term.112
“Beat the market” strategies tend to take two forms. One
approach is to take advantage of informational asymmetries (e.g.,
insider trading, high frequency trading or other ways of trading
“ahead” of others). The other is passive investing — “buying the
market” and keeping costs as low as possible to ensure that one
doesn’t underperform the benchmark indices.
Both strategies disconnect the investment process from the real
economy. The former is disconnected from the underlying forces
driving value-creation in society. As Peter Bernstein observed,
investment “has to be a positive-sum game to some extent, or else
no one would play.”113 The latter increases systemic risk through
herding behaviour and the short-termism of markets.114 The
consequence of herding behaviour has been visible in markets —
increased volatility and a narrow focus on short-term market
prices. These effects have become matters of concern for society as
a whole (and for the interests of future generations) because of the
dislocations and imbalances they create.115
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Robert Skidelsky (citing John Maynard Keynes) explains how
price volatility is profoundly harmful to society and a source of
fundamental unfairness:116
[P]eople cannot be expected to take proper account of the consequences of
their economic acts if the standard of value [(i.e., price)] is constantly
fluctuating. [Keynes wrote that] “[u]nemployment, the precarious life of the
worker, the disappointment of expectation, the sudden loss of savings, the
excessive windfalls of individuals, the speculator, the profiteer — all these
proceed, in large measure, from the instability of the standard of value.”
Just as the duty of corporate directors to act in the “best
interests of the corporation” is no longer solely focused on the
interests of shareholders,117 reasonable expectations (and the duty
of impartiality) require fund fiduciaries to consider and balance the
divergent interests of current and future beneficiaries.118 This
means recognizing that the benefits of short-term financial returns
are impossible to measure without referring to a beneficiary’s
circumstances — such as quality of life, availability of public
services — and that fund fiduciaries should examine the effects
their investment decisions will have on these circumstances when
determining whether their decisions will leave beneficiaries
objectively better off. In other words, it requires fiduciaries to
“consider questions of future value rather than price”,119 and
“consider[. . .] how their investments impact positively or nega-
tively the stability of the financial system, the direction of the
economy, and the sustainability of the environment.”120
The intergenerational dimension to this challenge is that the
relationships will never be based on reciprocity — we depend on
the behaviour of those who precede us but they are not dependent
on ours.121 Rawls justifies the aim of intergenerational justice by
stating that it is “demanded as a condition of bringing about the
full realization of just institutions and the fair value of liberty.”122
He illustrated the distinction between the concepts of reason and
rationality by referencing when people make remarks such as
(February 2012), at p. 30, online: <http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/06/Lydenberg_ReasonRationality.pdf4.
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“their proposal was perfectly rational given their strong bargaining
position, but it was nevertheless highly unreasonable, even
outrageous.”123 In contrast, Black’s Legal Dictionary defines a
“reasonable person” as “a person who exercises the degree of
attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment that society
requires of its members for the protection of their own and others’
interests.”124
5. Exercise of Public Interest Powers
Like many empowering statutes, securities legislation confers on
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) the ability to make a
wide range of punitive and remedial orders if “in its opinion it is in
the public interest” to do so.125 Despite numerous references to the
“public interest” in the Ontario Securities Act,126 there is no
statutory definition of the term or guidance as to the scope of such
power and how it should be exercised. In recent years, the scope of
orders made by the OSC using its public jurisdiction has expanded
considerably.127
In Canadian Tire128 the OSC noted that a breach of securities
laws is not a precondition to a public interest order and
characterized as “facts that demand some relief” cases involving
“an abusive transaction that will have a deleterious effect on a class
of investors in particular, or on capital markets in general”, or “a
transaction that is clearly abusive of investors and of the capital
markets, whether or not that transaction constitutes a breach of
the Act, the regulations or policy statement.”129 In upholding this
decision on judicial review, the Ontario Divisional Court noted
that the transaction under scrutiny confounded the “justifiable
expectations” of investors and the marketplace.130 In Asbestos, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the OSC may act in the absence of
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a breach of securities laws to address conduct that is abusive of
investors and capital markets or designed to avoid the animating
principles behind securities regulation.131
Since Canadian Tire, the Commission has exercised its public
interest jurisdiction in a wide range of take-over and enforcement
decisions. In doing so, the Commission has been prepared to make
determinations with respect to the exercise by directors of their
statutory duties under corporate law, particularly in respect of
change of control situations.132 In one case, despite having
determined that the making of a materially misleading statement
by an issuer did not technically violate securities law, the
Commission issued sanctions on the basis that “there should be
no doubt in the minds of market participants that the Commission
is entitled to exercise its public interest jurisdiction where any
inaccurate, misleading or untrue public statement is made, whether
or not the statement contravenes Ontario securities law.”133 More
recently, the Commission sanctioned an officer of a public
company for trading in shares of another company that was
subsequently acquired by the officer’s company. After finding that
there was no breach of the Securities Act, the Commission
exercised its public interest powers to sanction the officer on the
basis that, as a market participant, he was expected (and failed) to
adhere to a high standard of behaviour.134
The “justifiable expectations”135 standard, employed by the
Divisional Court in Canadian Tire, has proven to be a reasonably
accurate litmus test for Commission intervention. While many
have urged the Commission to develop more transparent standards
and principles for when its public interest power will be exercised,
the doctrine of reasonable expectations, to the extent that it
incorporates the idea that courts and regulators should examine
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Re Magna International Inc. (2010), 34 O.S.C.B. 1290 (Ont. Securities Comm.),
noting that, while “certain investors or shareholders may consider the price
proposed to be paid [in the impugned transaction] to be outrageous”, share-
holders had already been given an opportunity to approve the proposed
transaction and contest its “fairness” in court under corporate law, and
accordingly, the objecting shareholders could not argue that their reasonable
expectations had been defeated.
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the effect of market participants’ conduct on investor confidence in
Ontario capital markets, has proven to be a powerful predictor of
the Commission’s willingness to exercise this extraordinary
authority.136
Given the Commission’s explicit adoption of a “reasonable
expectations” standard, the increased frequency with which the
Commission has invoked its public interest jurisdiction137 and the
increasingly broad scope of circumstances in which it has done so
should not come as a surprise. As noted previously, there is a
degree of circularity embedded in the standard. Over time, it has
become “reasonable” to expect the Commission’s willingness to
intervene, even absent a statutory breach, when investor con-
fidence is at stake.
Market participants seeking to act in compliance with the
“public interest”, as viewed by the Commission, can use reasonable
expectations as a guide. Instead of only asking whether a proposed
course of action is “legal”, they should also consider whether that
course of action is likely to be seen as undermining the integrity of
the capital markets — by, for instance, undermining an important
principle (e.g., that statements to investors should not be
materially misleading) or undermining confidence in the officers
of public companies or other classes of market participants who
rely on such confidence to perform their duties and create
economic and social value.
V. CONCLUSION
Rebecca Henderson and Karthik Ramanna recently argued that
the traditional view that managers have a duty to take every
opportunity (within the bounds of the law) to maximize profit may
be compelling if there is an active, or “thick” political market, in
which diverse interests are meaningfully represented, and legisla-
tors and regulators have access to the information necessary to
promulgate rules that serve the public interest, as this political
market could check the consequences of self-interested profit-
seeking that would otherwise distort the conditions for capital-
ism.138 “Thin” political markets, on the other hand — in which
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political processes are dominated by special interest groups, or in
which legislators’ and regulators’ ability to promulgate or
anticipate the need for new rules is impeded by a lack of
information or political will — create a need for duties to be
reframed so as to require corporations and their managers to play
an active role in maintaining the conditions that sustain
capitalism.139 “This duty might at times require subverting the
[short-term] profit interests of the firm itself.”140 The scale of the
environmental and societal challenges we face eclipses the capacity
of individual governments and frameworks for governmental co-
operation to address these challenges remain nascent at best. Our
era of “thin” political markets creates an obligation, and an
opportunity, for market participants to help address these
challenges, using reasonable expectations as a guide.
The use of reasonable expectations as a legal benchmark will
continue to grow in importance. Indeed, this trend may well be
amplified by big data, smartphone, and other technologies that
enhance transparency by making it easier to identify misconduct or
conduct that has unintended negative effects on society (and,
accordingly, provide an evidentiary basis on which to justify
regulatory or judicial action to address conduct that violates
reasonable expectations). It therefore would be prudent for market
participants to use reasonable expectations as a guide when
making decisions that affect the interests of others.
This article has aimed to provide a framework for under-
standing the doctrine, by noting its consistent focus on requiring
powerful actors to avoid courses of action that cause unnecessary
or disproportionate harm to others, and on upholding the integrity
of legal and regulatory regimes, as well as the social institutions
that rely on these regimes. Given the broader trends discussed
above, the doctrine of reasonable expectations will likely continue
to develop into a central instrument for requiring market
participants to consider the effects their actions have on their
stakeholders, as well as the environment and society as a whole.
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